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The economics of environmental federalism identifies two book-end departures from the first-best,
which equates marginal costs and benefits in all local jurisdictions.  Local governments may respond
to local conditions, but ignore inter-jurisdictional spillovers.  Alternatively, central governments may
internalize spillovers, but impose uniform regulations ignoring local hetero-geneity.  We provide a
simple model that demonstrates that the choice of policy depends crucial-ly on the shape of marginal
abatement costs.  If marginal costs are increasing and convex, then abatement cost elasticities will
tend to be higher around the local policies.  This increases the deadweight loss of those policies relative
to the centralized policy, ceteris paribus.
Using a large simulation model, we then empirically explore the tradeoffs between local versus second-best
uniform policies for US air pollution.  We find that US states acting in their own interest lose about
31.5% of the potential first-best benefits, whereas the second-best uniform policy loses only 0.2%
of benefits.  The centralized policy outperforms the state policy for two reasons.  First, inter-state spillovers
are simply more important that inter-state hetero-geneity in this application.  Second, welfare losses
are especially small under the uniform policy because elasticities are much higher over the relevant
range of the cost functions.
H. Spencer Banzhaf
Department of Economics
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1.  Introduction 
Environmental externalities typically take place within the context of a federation with several 
levels of government, as in the United States or the European Union.  The relative efficiency of 
assigning regulation to different levels of government is a central question for environmental 
policy.  A first-best policy would equate, in all locations, the marginal costs of abating pollution 
with marginal benefits, including spillovers into other jurisdictions.  However, in practice this 
policy is unobtainable.  Since the seminal work of Oates (1972), the fiscal federalism literature 
has emphasized two policies which depart from the first best in opposite ways, serving as book-
ends.
1  On one hand, central governments are likely to impose a one-size-fits-all uniform policy 
that ignores local conditions.  On the other hand, local jurisdictions can account for heterogeneity 
in benefits and costs, but they are likely to ignore inter-jurisdictional spillovers.  Accordingly, 
the fiscal federalism literature has emphasized two factors when choosing the level of govern-
ment at which to internalize externalities.  The first factor is the degree of inter-jurisdictional 
spillovers:  ceteris paribus, when spillovers are larger, the central government's policies will lead 
to higher welfare relative to local governments' policies.  The second factor is heterogeneity:  
ceteris paribus, when inter-jurisdictional heterogeneity in benefits is larger, local governments' 
policies will lead to higher welfare relative to the central government's. 
These trade-offs represent the Scylla and the Charybdis of environmental federalism.  As 
Oates (2002a) summarized: 
[W]e are left with a choice between two alternatives:  suboptimal local decisions 
on environmental quality or inefficient uniform national standards.  And which of 
these two alternatives leads to a higher level of social welfare is, in principle, un-
clear.  Empirical studies of these alternative regimes are needed to shed light on 
this issue. (p. 8) 
This paper contributes to this literature in two ways.  First, it introduces a new third factor, 
previously unnoticed, that plays an important role in the performance of different levels of 
government.  In particular, we show that the more convex the supply of pollution abatement, the 
                                                                 
1 For more recent reviews, see Oates (1999, 2002a), Dalmazzone (2006), and Levinson (2003).  
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more centralized policies increase welfare relative to local policies.  Second, illustrating the 
importance of all three factors, it fills the empirical gap highlighted in the above quotation, for 
arguably the most important environmental application facing developed economies over the last 
50 years:  ambient air pollution. 
We begin with a simple model of pollution in a federation.  The model includes hetero-
geneous marginal benefits of pollution abatement, inter-jurisdictional spillovers in benefits, and 
heterogeneity in the shapes of marginal abatement cost functions.  Regulation involves setting 
pollution prices.  The prices can be interpreted as Pigouvian taxes on pollution or, equivalently, 
because there is no uncertainty, they can be thought of as the price under a tradable pollution 
quota. 
Analogous to the theory of optimal taxation, we show that the deadweight loss from er-
rors in pollution prices, whether from ignoring inter-state spillovers or from ignoring heterogene-
ity, depends in part on the slopes of the marginal abatement cost curves over the region of the 
error.  If they are highly inelastic, deadweight loss from errors in pollution prices will be small.  
This simple insight has an important—and to our knowledge previously unnoted—implication 
for environmental federalism.  Simply put, if (1) the devolved policy involves the mistake of 
systematically under-pricing pollution (because of ignoring inter-jurisdictional policies); (2) the 
centralized policy involves the mistake of noise around the optimal prices (from imposing some 
average price); and (3) the marginal abatement cost functions (i.e. abatement supply functions) 
are increasing and convex in abatement (as we find empirically), then marginal abatement costs 
will tend to be more inelastic around the uniform policy.  Other things equal, this tends to give 
the centralized policy an edge over devolved policies.
2 
The remainder of this paper is an empirical examination of these tradeoffs for the case of 
sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxide (NOx) pollution from the US electricity sector, the most 
important source of ambient air pollution in the United States.  We use a detailed simulation 
model of the US electricity sector, together with models of pollution dispersions and damages, to 
compute three policies for regulating emissions.  First, we find a reference policy, with fully 
                                                                 
2 We certainly do not claim that centralized policies will be better in all contexts.  Clearly, if spillovers are 
low, so all benefits are essentially local, and heterogeneity in local benefits are substantial, then it is 
preferable to devolve authority to local jurisdictions.  
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differentiated state-level pollution prices that internalize all spillovers.
3  Second, we find the 
"optimal" policies from the perspective of each state acting under autarky.  Finally, following 
Banzhaf et al. (2004), we also find the second-best uniform policy. 
We find that that the reference policy yields substantial benefits over no control 
($59.7 billion), consistent with the high benefit-cost ratios typically found for air pollution 
(Banzhaf et al. 2004, Muller and Mendelsohn 2007, US EPA 1999).  The devolved policies lose 
31.5% of those potential benefits.  However, the second-best uniform policy loses only 0.2% of 
these benefits (still $114 million).  Thus, the uniform policy approximates the first-best and far 
out-performs the state policies.  This occurs for two reasons.  First, most straightforwardly, inter-
jurisdictional spillovers appear to be a bigger problem in this application than heterogeneous 
benefits.  Yet the heterogeneity in benefits is not trivial:  the inter-state range in the marginal 
benefits of abatement differ by a factor of 5.7.  The second reason is that around the uniform 
policy, marginal abatement costs are quite inelastic, so the errors from ignoring the heterogeneity 
have little impact on over-all welfare.  This is not true around the state policies.  This is precisely 
the relationship we derive in our theoretical model. 
In addition to our theoretical contributions, our empirical analysis is to our knowledge the 
first to consider both sides of the environmental federalism dilemma for a major policy.  Howev-
er, other recent papers have considered various aspects of centralized policies.  Banzhaf et al. 
(2004) estimate the second-best uniform prices of SO2 and NOx, together with the resulting 
abatement, and find large welfare improvements from the status quo, but do not compare them 
either to the first-best case or to state policies.  We follow their basic approach in this paper, 
extending it to these other policies. 
Muller and Mendelsohn (2009) compare the relative welfare gains of switching from the 
status quo uniform price policy in the US (i.e. the acid rain trading program), which involves 
substantial under-abatement, to both a differentiated policy with the same aggregate emissions 
and to the first-best policy.  They do not consider the second-best uniform price policy or the 
state policies.  Thus, although both this paper and Muller and Mendelsohn (2009) cover similar 
ground, the two differ markedly in the questions they address.  Muller and Mendelsohn consider 
                                                                 
3 We abstract from this issue of pre-existing taxes on capital on labor.  In the context of those distortions, 
all the policies considered here would be second-best (Goulder et al. 1999, Parry 2005).  
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how the status quo price policies can be improved, looking at two margins, more differentiation 
(holding aggregate emissions at their sub-optimal level) versus more abatement (holding relative 
inter-jurisdictional prices constant at 1:1).  We compare a policy devolving authority to local 
governments to a uniform policy, assuming optimization in each regime. 
Others have considered regulations imposing a uniform ambient standard in each juris-
diction, rather than a uniform pollution price.  Oates, Portney, and McGartland (1989) point out 
that, when these standards represent minimum environmental quality rather than a specific level, 
the costs of imposing this standard may not always be as high as one would expect.  Neverthe-
less, they can be substantial.  Dinan, Cropper, and Portney (1999) consider drinking water 
quality, a local public good with little or no spillover effects.  In this case, local jurisdictions 
have an incentive to mandate the efficient level.  Thus, the devolved policy is equivalent to the 
first-best.  In contrast, the centralized uniform standard will be very inefficient.  Since there are 
economies of scale in the reduction of pollutants in drinking water, small systems have higher 
cost per individual benefiting.  Dinan et al. find that some households may lose up to $774 
dollars per year from requiring the uniform regulation.  Thus, centralized uniform regulation is 
less efficient than local control in this situation.  See also Oates (2002b) for a discussion of 
similar issues related to arsenic in drinking water. 
Implicit in our discussion are two hypotheses about the behavior of local jurisdictions.  
First, we assume they do internalize local benefits.  This is the central finding of the environmen-
tal federalism literature (Oates and Schwab 1988).  A long literature discusses potential depar-
tures from this central result under more general conditions, with the possibility of either a "race 
to the bottom" or a "race to the top" (Kunce and Shogren 2005; Levinson 2003; Markusen et al. 
1995; Oates and Schwab 1988, 1996; Wellisch 1995).  We abstract from these issues.   
Second, we assume states ignore benefits or damages that accrue outside of their own 
borders.  Empirical evidence seems to confirm this hypothesis.  Helland and Whitford (2003) 
find that large polluting facilities in the US tend to be located in border counties, suggesting that 
states are less environmentally stringent when pollution is more likely to travel out of state.  
Sigman (2005) finds evidence that states ignore interstate spillovers in the case of water pollu-
tion.  Similarly, Sigman (2007) finds that, internationally, nations with more decentralized 
governments have higher levels of regional (but not local) pollution.  At the same time, however,  
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List and Gerking (2000) find no evidence that Reagan’s implementation of the "New Federal-
ism," with its significant transfer of responsibility to state governments, had a negative effect on 
aggregate air emissions (see also Millimet 2003, Millimet and List 2003, and Fomby and Lin 
2006).  This may be because, especially at the time, federal policies already under-control, so it 
was not necessarily in states' interests to reduce enforcement. 
2.  Theoretical Model 
We begin with a simple model of pollution in a federation.  Pollution abatement Ai in each state 
i = 1…N has constant marginal benefits within-state MBii and on other states j, MBij.
4  Marginal 
national benefits for abatement in state i are MNBi = ∑jMBij ≥ MBii.  Constant marginal benefits 
implies that within-state benefits are independent of inter-state spillovers and, hence, actions in 
other states.  As discussed below, empirical evidence suggests that air pollution benefits are 
indeed approximately constant.  In addition, each state has a marginal cost of abatement function 
MCi(Ai), with MC'i(Ai) ≥ 0.  Inverting the marginal cost function gives the level of abatement 
associated with any price on pollution Ai(ti). 
Policies involve choosing a vector of pollution prices (t1…tN), such as through a Pigou-
vian tax or through a generalized cap-and-trade system. 
2.1.  First-Best Policy 
The total potential gains from choosing a vector of pollution prices (t1…tN) is 
 
                              




   
.  (1)
The first term is the gross benefits from the induced abatement in each state, equal to constant 
marginal benefits times abatement.  The integral represents total abatement costs. 
The first order conditions are: 
  MCi(Ai)  =  MNBi  i. (2) 
                                                                 
4 We assume abatement benefits are spatially uniform within local jurisdictions.  For purposes of the 
model, a "local jurisdiction" may be defined as that spatial scale at which this is so.  Alternatively, this 
can be considered an approximation to first best.  
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Thus, the first-best policy simply equates marginal national benefits to marginal costs in each 
state.  This could be accomplished by setting a Pigouvian tax ti
* in each state equal to MNBi.  
Alternatively, it could be accomplished by setting a national quota on pollution at the appropriate 
level and allowing inter-state trade at the ratios of marginal national benefits. 
2.2.  State Policies 
The first departure from first-best that we consider is a policy in which authority is devolved to 
the states.  From the perspective of each state i, total within-state benefits are: 
 
                            
   
           
      
 
  .  (3)
Thus, the states equate their marginal within-state benefits to marginal costs: 
  MCi(Ai)  =  MBii  i. (4) 
This allows for heterogeneity in the same way as the first-best policy, but departs from the first-
best in ignoring inter-state spillovers.  Since MBii < MNBi, states under abate. 
The approximate deadweight loss of the collective state policies, compared to the first-
best policy, is given by: 
 




   




   
    is the inverse of the slope of state i’s marginal abatement cost curve.  Evidently, this 
loss shrinks to zero as MBii → MNBi.  That is, if all pollution damages are captured within-state, 
there are no inter-jurisdictional spillovers for the central government to internalize and the state 
polices are equivalent to the first-best policy.  It also shrinks as 
   
    → 0.  That is, as states' 
marginal abatement cost curves become steeper, given mistakes in pricing have smaller real 
effects on abatement. 
2.3.  Uniform Policy 
In the second departure from the first-best that we consider, the federal government sets a single  
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policy for the whole nation.  In computing the optimal policy, the central government allows for 
inter-state spillovers, but is constrained to equate marginal costs in all states.  For example, the 
central government may set a single uniform Pigouvian tax rate tu; alternatively, it could set a 
national pollution cap with trading across states at a 1:1 ratio and yielding a pollution price of tu. 
The net benefits of this policy are 
 
                              




   
.  (6)
Taking first-order conditions with respect to tu and recognizing that MCi(Ai(tu))=tu (that is, in all 
states firms equate marginal abatement costs to tu), yields: 
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.  (8)
That is, the second-best uniform price is a weighted average of each state’s marginal national 
abatement benefits, where the weights are the relative slopes of the marginal abatement cost 
curves.  States with inelastic marginal cost curves receive a low weight, because ignoring them 
causes little deadweight loss. 
We can derive further insights into this case by considering a special kind of heterogenei-
ty in the marginal cost curves, motivated by the economics of pollution abatement.  Note first 
that we can focus on heterogeneity in the slopes of the marginal abatement cost function, for two 
reasons.  First, as a practical matter firms choose a finite level of pollution at zero abatement 
costs, so that MC(0)=0 for all firms and there are no differences in the intercept of the marginal 
cost function.  Second, it is these slopes that enter Equation (8), so they contain the relevant 
economic information. 
A general way to model this is to suppose that all marginal cost curves can be written  
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MCi(Ai)=MC(A/αi), so the inverse marginal cost curves can be written Ai(t) = αiA(t).  Without 
loss of generality, we arbitrarily choose the reference curve A(t) so that ∑iαi=1.  This structure 
subsumes a number of special cases.  For example, it is consistent with simple linear marginal 
cost curves with slopes equal to αi.  More interestingly for our purposes, it is also consistent with 
convex marginal cost curves in percentage abatement.  That is, suppose each state has the same 
shaped marginal cost curve, only re-scaled on the domain [0,    ], where     represents maximal 
or 100% abatement in state i.  In that case, αi=   /∑       , the (renormalized) baseline emissions 
level.
5  As we shall see, this is a reasonable approximation to the empirically observed marginal 
cost curves.  If Illinois and Maine release 200,000 tons and 5000 tons of SO2 respectively when 
uncontrolled, it is simply easier for Illinois to abate 5000 tons than for Maine to do so.  Accor-
dingly, we shall assume for the remainder of this section that the weights αi are baseline emis-
sions. 
In this case the first-order condition (7) now becomes: 
    
  
             
 
   
    0 .   (9)
Dividing through by dA/dt, re-arranging, and using ∑αi=1 gives 
 
  
            
 
   
.  (10)
Again, the second-best uniform Pigouvian tax is a weighted average of each state’s first-best 
Pigouvian tax levels.  The weights are baseline emissions. 
At first glance, it may appear that this result says nothing more than that large polluters 
carry more weight.  However, this is only because high-polluting states (with high    ) have more 
elastic marginal cost curves.  Low-polluting states have inelastic marginal cost curves, so they 
can be virtually ignored when computing the second-best uniform policy.  If these slopes were 
the same, large baseline emissions per se would not affect marginal conditions and so would 
                                                                 
5 That is, if A(t) represents the percentage abatement induced in any jurisdiction by t, then Ai =    *A.  We 
then simply renormalize A by multiplying by the constant ∑        so that Ai = (   /∑       )*A.  
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have no effect on the optimal price. 
This intuition is clear from the formula for deadweight loss relative to the first-best.  The 
over-all deadweight loss of the uniform policy, relative to the first best, is approximately 
 




   
          




Substituting in the above expression for   
  and re-arranging slightly gives 
 





                    
 










    
 ,  (12)
where     
  is the weighted empirical variance of the MNB.  Thus, the welfare loss of the second-
best uniform policy is proportionate to the weighted variance in marginal benefits across local 
jurisdictions.  If there is no heterogeneity in benefits, then this policy is equivalent to the first 
best. 
The importance of such heterogeneity generally is well-established in the environmental 
federalism literature (Oates 1972, 2002a, Dalmazzone 2006).  However, to this point, the litera-
ture does not seem to have appreciated the importance of how heterogeneity in benefits interacts 
with heterogeneity in costs.  In particular, note that the loss in welfare from the uniform policy is 
proportionate to the weighted variance in marginal benefits, where the weights are the cost 
scalings.  For any fixed wedge between MNBi and   
 , the decrease in welfare from the first best 
is scaled in Equation (11) by   
  
  , the slope of the marginal cost curve.  Thus, if the marginal 
cost curve is highly inelastic, the distortion will be small.
6  This is precisely what happens for 
low values of    . 
Figure 1a and 1b illustrate this logic.  The first panel shows a case where N=2 and the 
marginal cost curves are identical for the two states, but MNB2 > MNB1.  In this case, the uniform 
                                                                 
6 The logic is analogous to the Ramsey analysis of the deadweight loss of taxation or, more generally, 
Baumol and Bradford's (1970) analysis of optimal departures from marginal cost pricing subject to a 
constraint.  Here, the constraint is the requirement of uniformity and the wedge is the difference between 
  
  and MNBi.  
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policy proceeds by setting   
  equal to the simple average of the two MNB levels, equating the 
marginal deadweight loss in each state.  (Although the totals are different, the derivative of 
deadweights losses A and B with respect to t are identical).  The second panel is the same except 
that     <    :  State 1 has low baseline emissions and so its marginal cost curve becomes inelas-
tic at lower levels of abatement.  If   
  were set at the same level as before, the marginal dead-
weight loss around State 1 would be much lower than around State 2 because of the relative 
elasticities of the marginal cost curves.  Total deadweight loss could be reduced by raising   
  
closer to MNB2.  For example, the shaded areas in Figure 1b show the respective welfare gain in 
State 2 and loss in State 1 of increasing the pollution price to   
 ′, which is a net gain in welfare.  
Although for the case of N>2 it will not be possible to equate the marginal deadweight loss in all 
states, the intuition for the role of marginal abatement costs still holds. 
2.4.  Comparison of Policies 
This analysis has a very important implication for environmental policy in a federation:  
ceteris paribus, the more marginal abatement costs are convex (concave), the higher (lower) the 
level of welfare under a centralized policy relative to the devolved policies.
7  More precisely, 
suppose benefits MNBi, spillovers (MNBi - MBii), and cost scaling i are random variables and 
consider the following three assumptions: 
Assumptions 
1.  Marginal social benefits, spillovers, and marginal cost scalings are uncorrelated:   
MNBi  i, (MNBi - MBii)  i and (MNBi - MBii)  MNBi. 
2.  The distribution of marginal social benefits is symmetric, so that the third central 
moments can be ignored:  E                      =0. 
3.  Marginal abatement costs are increasing and third and higher orders can be ignored:  
  
   > 0, 
   
    ≈ 0.  Convexity is given by the second order:  
   
    >/< 0. 
Under these conditions, the following federalism propositions hold. 
                                                                 
7 We emphasize that we are speaking of marginal cost functions.  With nonincreasing returns to scale, 
neoclassical cost functions are always convex, so marginal cost functions are necessarily non-decreasing.  
The convexity/concavity of such marginal cost functions is an empirical matter.  
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Proposition 1.  Ceteris paribus, as spillovers become less important, decentralized poli-
cies yield higher welfare.  Moreover, as spillovers go to zero, ∑                  
     → 0, 
decentralized policies approach the first best. 
Proposition 2.  Ceteris paribus, as heterogeneity in abatement benefits become less im-
portant, the centralized policy yields higher welfare.  Moreover, as heterogeneity goes to 
zero, ∑                         
     → 0, the uniform policy approaches the first best. 
Proposition 3.  Ceteris paribus, as marginal abatement costs become more convex (con-
cave), the centralized policy yields a higher (lower) level of welfare relative to local poli-
cies. 
Proof:  See the appendix. 
The first two propositions reflect the standard factors from the literature (e.g. Oates 1972, 
2002a).  We include them here only for completeness and to show that our model remains 
consistent with the standard intuition.  The third proposition is new.  Whereas the first two relate 
to the errors in the price signals implicit in the policies adopted by each level of government, the 
third relates to how these price signals translate into distortions in abatement.  Although the 
proof involves some arithmetic, the intuition behind this proposition is straightforward.  The 
centralized policy induces errors around the optimal value, being sometimes too high and some-
times too low.  The state policies are always too low.  But with convex marginal costs, the errors 
in the state policies, being always downward, systematically occur where the abatement supply 
curve is more elastic, leading to greater deadweight losses.  With concave marginal costs, the 
opposite would be true. 
The intuition can be seen again in Figure 1a.  Again, there are two jurisdictions with iden-
tical marginal cost curves but with the heterogeneity in benefits as shown.  Suppose further that 
spillovers are the same for each jurisdiction and equal to (MNB2-  
 ):  thus, MB2=  
  and MB1=0.  
The central government of course chooses   
  with deadweight loss A+B, as before.  The local 
jurisdictions choose t2=MB2 and t1=0, respectively, with deadweight loss A+C.  In all four cases 
(2 policies, 2 jurisdictions), the prices are off by the same amount in absolute value.  But because 
the local jurisdictions systematically under-price pollution, whereas the central government is 
right "on average," elasticities are higher in the neighborhood of the local policies, and hence so 
is deadweight loss.  Although the price effects are the same, the convex marginal cost curves  
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insure that the Harberger triangles A, B, C are successively bigger.
8 
This example suggests another, somewhat stronger way to re-state the ceteris paribus 
condition in Proposition 3.  Namely, if the first two factors, spillovers and heterogeneity, exactly 
offset, so that welfare under the centralized and devolved policies are identical with linear 
marginal cost curves, then welfare will be higher under the centralized policy when marginal 
costs are convex and higher under the devolved policies when they are concave.  We state this 
formally in the following corollary. 
Corollary to Proposition 3.  Suppose the problems of inter-jurisdictional heterogeneity 
in marginal benefits and inter-jurisdictional spillovers are equally balanced, so that  
∑                  
        ∑                         
    ,  
noting that   
  =            .  Then social welfare under the centralized policy is greater than, 
equal to, or less than welfare under the devolved policies according to whether the mar-
ginal abatement cost curves are respectively convex, linear, or concave. 
Proof:  See the appendix. 
We conclude by noting that if marginal abatement costs and marginal benefits are nega-
tively correlated (i and MNBi are positively correlated), then relative welfare will be even 
higher under the centralized policy.  In this case,   
  will be weighted upward toward the high-
MNB states.  If marginal costs are convex, so that MC''(A)>0, then at these higher pollution 
                                                                 
8 It is worth noting here a deceptively attractive non-theorem that has proven quite tempting both to us 
and to more than one commentator.  In particular, reasoning analogously from Weitzman (1974), it would 
seem that if governments are using a uniform ambient quality standard, imposing uniform quantities of 
pollution across jurisdictions instead of uniform prices, then local jurisdictions would outperform the 
central policy if marginal costs are convex.  In fact, this is not necessarily so.  Figure 1A provides a 
counter-example.  In this case, where there is no heterogeneity in costs, the central policy is the same 
whether framed as equating marginal costs or equating quantities.  There is a one-to-one correspondence 
between the two.  The central government would simply set the quantity in each jurisdiction associated 
with tu again, outperforming the local policies as discussed previously.  With heterogeneity in costs, this 
will not be so in general, but the counter-example disproves the non-theorem.  The problem is that 
reasoning analogously from Weitzman's earlier work is misleading in this context.  Whereas Weitzman's 
results provide insights into the relative performance of price versus quantity instruments based on the 
slope of marginal cost curves, our results provide insights into the relative performance of heterogeneous 
under-pricing versus homogenous average pricing, using either quantity or price instruments, based on 
the convexity of marginal cost curves.  Further complicating the analysis of ambient standards is the fact 
that in practice they generally dictate a lower bound, giving an inequality rather than equality constraint 
(Oates, Portney, and McGartland 1989).  
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prices the other marginal cost curves will be especially inelastic.  As we shall see, this insight is 
quite important for the case of air pollution in the US.  As an empirical matter, large baseline 
polluters (high  states) like North Carolina and Illinois have high marginal benefits and small 
baseline polluters (low  states) like Maine and New Mexico have low marginal benefits. 
3.  Electricity and Pollution Models 
We illustrate the importance of all three factors for one of the most important policy examples 
for environmental federalism:  inter-state air pollution in the United States.  Not only are the 
stakes of air pollution policies large, with estimated annual benefits from the Clean Air Act of 
$110 billion and annual direct compliance costs of $27 billion (US EPA 1999), but historically 
the level of government controlling standards, prices, and enforcement has been a matter of 
debate.  Moreover, the lessons learned from this example have natural applications in other 
contexts as well, such as the European Union. 
Our empirical methodology for comparing the trade-offs between local heterogeneity in 
damages versus inter-jurisdictional spillovers follows the approach taken by Banzhaf, Burtraw, 
and Palmer (2004), who studied a second-best uniform standard for the US electricity sector.  
Their work has also been used by Parry (2004, 2005) to help calibrate general equilibrium 
models of pollution control.  The basic procedure involves two steps.  First, a detailed model of 
the electricity sector simulates state-specific marginal abatement cost functions.  Second, an 
integrated assessment model estimates the within-state and nationwide benefits of each state’s 
abatement.  The following two sub-sections discuss these two models in more detail, and a third 
discusses how we combine them to estimate the federalism trade-offs for air pollution. 
3.1 Marginal Abatement Cost Functions 
Our estimates of state-specific marginal abatement cost functions are based on output 
from the "Haiku" model of the electricity sector, developed at Resources for the Future (Paul and 
Burtraw 2002).  It has been used in a number of peer-reviewed articles (e.g. Banzhaf et al. 2004, 
Burtraw et al. 2010, Palmer and Burtraw 2005, Pizer et al. 2006).  In essence, it is a simulation 
model of regional electricity markets along with interregional electricity trade in the United 
States. 
The electricity model computes market equilibria in 13 regions corresponding to the Na- 
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tional Electricity Reliability Council (NERC) subregions, for three seasons (winter, summer, and 
spring/fall), and for four time blocks (base load, shoulder, peak, and super-peak), for a total of 
156 markets.  The demand side of the market is the aggregate of three sectoral electricity demand 
functions (commercial, industrial, and residential).  Demands for electricity have a constant 
elasticity calibrated from the academic literature. 
The model assigns all individual power plants in the continental U.S. to one of 46 model 
plant types.  The model plants differ by six fields:  plant technology, fuel type, coal demand 
region, pollution scrubbers, relative efficiency, and existence status.  Individual plants also 
remain differentiated by capacity and age.  The model accounts for developments in wind, solar, 
and hydroelectric power.  Electricity supply is also a function of endogenous fuel prices for each 
fuel type.  Fuels include 14 coal types, natural gas, and biomass, and delivery prices of each 
include a region-specific transportation cost.  Finally, the model can also accommodate Pigou-
vian taxes on pollution or pollution caps. 
Using these supply and demand inputs, the model solves for electricity quantities, prices, 
and pollution outputs.  Recognizing that power plants are long-term investments, the model 
solves for a 20-year time horizon, discounting future revenues and costs back to the decision-
making point.  In doing so, it solves for every fifth year and interpolates the results to interme-
diate years.  It also accounts for the competitive and regulated price regimes operating in each 
region. 
The model's data mainly comes from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) and 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Committee (FERC), with some additional information from the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  For additional details on the model, see Paul and 
Burtraw (2002). 
3.2. Abatement Benefit Functions 
We use the Tracking and Analysis Framework (TAF) integrated assessment model to es-
timate the benefits of pollution abatement.  Integrated assessment models make extensive use of 
transfer methods, which transfer information from the context of previous research to a new 
policy context (Desvousges et al. 1998, Navrud and Ready 2007).  Integrated assessment models 
of air pollution bring together contributions from many different areas of science, including 
meteorology and atmospheric chemistry, toxicology and epidemiology, and economics.  All of  
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the information works together allowing one model to compute all of the relevant effects togeth-
er. 
Several integrated assessment models of air pollution have been developed in recent 
years.  Desvousges et al. (1998) construct a model to study externalities from new power plant 
locations in Minnesota.  Muller and Mendelsohn (2007, 2009) use the Air Pollution Emissions 
Experiments and Policy analysis model (APEEP) to examine the marginal damages of releasing 
one additional ton of emissions from any of 10,000 sources in the US.  Rowe, Lang, and Chest-
nut (1996) use the computerized Externality Model (EXMOD) to measure externalities from 
electricity production in New York.  The US EPA uses a model called BENMAP (Abt 2008). 
TAF consists of several modules, each of which was developed by a team of experts in 
their respective field.
9  The first module is a set of seasonal source-receptor matrices, which track 
pollutants from their source to the locations that they damage.  The source-receptor matrices in 
TAF are simplified versions of the Advanced Source Trajectory Regional Air Pollution model 
(ASTRAP), which is based on 11 years of weather data.  TAF identifies a source centroid and a 
receptor centroid for each state based on electricity generation patterns and population respec-
tively.  These centroids are used to compute reduced form source-receptor matrices of state-to-
state pollution flows.  The pollution flows account not only for a simple Gaussian dispersion of 
gasses, but also for the down-stream chemical reactions which convert SO2 and NOx to sulfates 
and other fine particulates. 
The second module uses epidemiological relationships to estimate the effect of pollution 
concentrations in each state on mortality rates and incidences of various short-term and chronic 
illnesses.
10  These estimates are based on total populations and their age-distributions within each 
state.  Mortality rates are the most important driver of damages, and are based on a cross-
sectional study by Pope et al. (1995).  The morbidity effects include, for particulates, chronic 
bronchitis, chronic cough, acute bronchitis cases, upper respiratory symptoms, cough episodes, 
                                                                 
9 See Lumina (2009) and Argonne National Labs (1996) for overviews of the basic architecture of the 
model.  Our version of the model updates several functional relationships from the earlier versions 
described there.  The updates, noted in more detail below, include alternative estimates of mortality 
effects and estimates of the valuation of all health effects. 
10 In principle, the model might also account for effects on agriculture, materials, and visibility.  However, 
previous work has found that health effects account for the vast majority of damages (Desvousges et al. 
1998, Muller and Mendelsohn 2007, Rowe et al. 1996).  
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and croup; for SO2, they include chest discomfort and cough episodes; and for NO2, they include 
eye irritation and upper respiratory symptoms. 
The third and final module assigns monetary values to these damages based on economic 
studies of the value of statistical life and other health valuation studies.  Most importantly, the 
value of a statistical life in TAF is taken from a meta-analysis by Mrozek and Taylor (2002) and 
is $2.32 million (in 2000 dollars).  This value is on the low end of the range in the literature, and 
compares to the value of $5.5 million (in 2000 dollars) used by the EPA in its benefit-cost 
analyses.  Values for short-term morbidity effects are taken from a meta-analysis by Johnson et 
al. (1997). 
TAF takes a baseline emissions scenario and a policy emissions scenario and calculates 
the total damages of each by state.  The difference is the effect of the policy. 
3.3. Policy Simulations 
We use these models to identify a fully differentiated policy, a second-best federal uni-
form policy, and individual states’ self-regarding policies in the following way.  We compute 
these policies for 45 of the 48 continental states.
11 
In the first step, successive levels of SO2 or NOx taxes are input into the electricity model, 
which then estimates the corresponding level of pollution abatement in each state for that tax 
level (Banzhaf et al. 2004).  The scenarios include a simulated baseline of no control, in which 
abatement investments such as scrubbers, which are found on power plants today as a result of 
current regulations, are removed.  From this simulated counterfactual, SO2 taxes are added, 
varying from $500 to $6500 per ton.  The NOx taxes vary from $700 to $1500.  This procedure 
traces out a series of state-specific marginal abatement cost functions (or abatement supply 
functions) that form one primitive for our analysis of environmental federalism.  Adjustments 
allowed in the model include fuel switching, investment in post-combustion controls such as 
scrubbers, investment in new gas or renewable energy, and conservation by end-users induced by 
                                                                 
11 The District of Columbia, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Idaho are excluded from the analysis as they do 
not contribute any significant level of emissions.    However, when computing national benefits, we do 





We emphasize that there is nothing about this procedure that limits its applicability to on-
ly Pigouvian tax policies.  Inputting various pollution taxes into the model is simply a heuristic 
for tracing out marginal abatement costs.  The resulting abatement cost curves can be used to 
analyze any policies, including the cap-and-trade policies that have dominated US air pollution 
policy since 1990. 
In constructing a specific state’s abatement cost function, we allow for inter-state trading 
in electricity, but assume that the state adopts policies to limit the "pollution haven effect," or the 
"leakage" of pollution to other states.
13  Doing so may well be consistent with the state’s self-
interest, as otherwise leakage from a state to its neighbors would spill back over into the state.  
More to the point, empirically, individual states that are adopting policies separate from federal 
requirements are in fact addressing such leakage.  California, which has mandated carbon 
reductions by 2020, is requiring that load-serving entities incorporate a shadow price on electrici-
ty imports to account for the pollution content of those imports.  Although no tax is ever levied, 
load-serving entities must act as if there were such a tax in their decision-making.  California 
also is requiring that any long-term purchases of power be subject to a cap on emissions per 
megawatt of electricity.  In addition, northeastern states in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initia-
tive (RGGI) are considering similar policies, as well as including the pollution-content of elec-
tricity imports as part of a total pollution cap (Farnsworth et al. 2007).  We model the first of 
these policies, adopted in California, in which dispatch within a state proceeds "as-if" there were 
a tariff on the pollution content of imports, with the hypothetical tariff equal to the state’s 
marginal abatement costs.  (Equivalently, the state sets an overall cap on pollution, with the 
pollution content of imports counting toward the cap.) 
The information that is observed from the electricity model is a sequence of price-
pollution pairs.  Figure 2 shows examples of the marginal abatement cost functions for SO2 for 
four states:  Colorado, New York, Texas, and Connecticut.  The origin is the simulated baseline 
of no control, and involves much lower investment in abatement technologies (and much more 
                                                                 
12 See Banzhaf et al. (2004) for a detailed breakdown of these equilibrium adjustments at different tax 
levels, under a simulation similar to the uniform policy considered here. 
13 On the treatment of such leakage in US regional policies, see Burtraw et al. (2006), Farnsworth et al. 
(2007), and Sue Wing and Kolodziej (2009).  
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pollution) than found under actual regulatory environments today.  The dotted line is a simple 
linear interpolation of the output from the electricity model.  The solid line imposes some 
smoothness on the raw data as well as monotonicity, using non-parametric local regression.
14  
We impose some smoothness on the data because the raw data for some small states like Con-
necticut, shown in Figure 2d, exhibit decreasing marginal abatement costs over some intervals.  
These are due to simulation error in the model, as well as the effects of inter-state trade.
15  The 
case of Connecticut is particularly extreme in this regard, because of its low emissions.  There, a 
little noise in the data can appear significant in percentage terms.  In most cases, such reversals 
are very small (e.g. New York and Texas shown in Figures 2b and 2c) or non-existent (e.g. 
Colorado shown in Figure 2a).  (Note how the scale of the x-axis is two orders of magnitude 
smaller in Connecticut than New York or Texas.) 
Importantly, the graphs reveal that marginal costs are far from linear.  Instead, they are 
very elastic at low levels of abatement and very inelastic--indeed, practically vertical--at high 
levels of abatement.  This is an important finding.  As noted in Section 2, it implies that states 
with low baseline emissions will have more inelastic costs around average benefits, giving them 
low weight in the calculation of   
 .  Because their abatement benefits tend to be lower, this raises 
  
 . 
On the benefits side, we input the emissions from each state separately into the TAF 
model.  By varying one state’s emissions and leaving all other states at their baseline emission 
levels, we thus generate state-specific marginal benefit functions.  For each state's emissions, we 
construct two such benefit functions, one counting only the within-state benefits, the other 
counting all national benefits.  Because the epidemiological literature suggests that health effects 
are virtually linear across the relevant range of pollution concentrations, marginal benefits for 
each state are necessarily constant, a standard result in air pollution policy analysis. 
                                                                 
14 In particular, we use a locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (Lowess) model (Fan and Gijbels 1996).  
This is a variant of local polynomial kernel regression, but it downweights large residuals and uses a 
variable bandwidth parameter determined by the distance from each point to its nearest neighbors.  We 
use a tricubic kernel. 
15 Even with "as if" pollution taxes at the border, substitution between out-of-state and within-state 
generation may well occur over some ranges of pollution taxes if abatement costs differ.  Although such 
effects our entirely plausible in general equilibrium, we impose monotonicity and smoothness on the data 
to facilitate partial equilibrium analyses.  
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Figure 3 puts the cost and benefit sides of the model together for four states:  Louisiana, 
California, Florida, and Illinois.  The solid upward sloping line is the estimated marginal cost of 
abatement curve.  The three dashed lines represent three prices.  All the figures plot $3912, 
which as we discuss below is our estimate of   
 .  The lower of the other two is the benefits for a 
state of reducing its own pollution; the upper of the other two is the benefits to the entire nation.  
The figure illustrates some of the differences across states.  In most states, within-state pollution 
costs are small and there is a large gap from the national costs.  In a large state like California, a 
larger share of the marginal damages from emissions falls within the state, and even MBii is 
greater than the average national benefit. 
We use these data to consider three policies as described in Section 2.  First, we consider 
a reference policy that accounts for both inter-jurisdictional spillovers and heterogeneity in 
damages.  In the reference policy, each state's marginal abatement costs are equated to its mar-
ginal national benefits.  That is, in each state, we find the intersection of the marginal cost curve 
with the upper dashed lines depicted in Figure 3.  If marginal benefits of abatement were uniform 
within states, this policy would be the first best.
16 
To this reference policy, we compare the two second-best policies which represent the 
tradeoffs inherent in environmental federalism.  One such second-best policy is one in which air 
pollution policies are devolved to each state.  This policy has the advantage of allowing for 
heterogeneity across states, but the disadvantage that self-interested states will ignore inter-
jurisdictional spillovers.  To find the outcomes of this policy, we equate each state’s marginal 
cost curve with MBii. 
Finally, following Banzhaf et al. (2004), we consider a second-best policy in which the 
Federal government sets a single Pigouvian tax (or single pollution cap with one-to-one inter-
state trading ratios).  This is the policy regime that prevails in the United States today.  This 
requires aggregating the marginal cost curves to a national marginal cost of abatement curve.  It 
similarly requires aggregating marginal benefits.  Marginal benefits are no longer constant, as at 
each point the marginal unit of pollution is associated with a different location, with differing 
                                                                 
16 Muller and Mendelsohn (2009) show that within-state heterogeneity in benefits can be substantial.  
However, since our goal here is to compare the effect of policy decisions at local versus national jurisdic-
tions, this reference policy is the appropriate standard of comparison, not a fully plant-level-differentiated 
first best.  
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damages.  However, there is no consistent trend in benefits, so smoothing this benefits curve 
results in a roughly flat marginal benefit function. 
By aggregating the benefits and costs accruing to each state under each scenario, we can 
now compare the net benefits for each policy. 
4.  Results 
To facilitate in-depth discussion, we concentrate on the results from SO2 policies; NOx policies 
are summarized briefly afterwards.  Tables 1 and 2 provide detailed information about the 
simulations from the three SO2 policies.  Table 1 provides the contribution to national welfare 
from the abatement activities of each state, for each policy, relative to a simulated baseline of no 
pollution controls.  These net benefits are computed by multiplying abatement by the (constant) 
national marginal benefits, and subtracting the area under the abating state’s marginal cost curve.  
Column 1 shows a state’s contribution to national benefits under the reference policy.  Column 2 
shows the national net benefits achieved when a state acts in its own interests.  And Column 3 
shows a state’s contribution when it complies with a national uniform policy. 
The bottom line of Table 1 is literally the bottom line of the empirical application.  It 
shows the total benefits of each policy, and the difference from the first best.  It shows that the 
benefits of the fully differentiated first-best policy are $59.7 billion, consistent with other esti-
mates of substantial gains from national pollution control (Banzhaf et al. 2004, Muller and 
Mendelsohn 2007, US EPA 1999).  More to the point, the states on their own are estimated to 
achieve national net benefits of $40.9 billion, simply acting out of their own self-interest.  This is 
a loss of 31.5% percent of the total potential benefits, which is substantial, but perhaps smaller 
than one might have guessed.  More surprising is that the second-best uniform policy achieves 
benefits of $59.6 billion, a loss of only 0.2% of the first-best benefits!
17 
                                                                 
17 Our estimated gain of differentiation of just over $100m compares to a recent estimate by Muller and 
Mendelsohn (2009) of $300m to $900m.  These are of the same order of magnitude (and all under 2% of 
first-best benefits), but the differences warrant discussion.  As noted above, they stem from the different 
policy contexts.  Muller and Mendelsohn consider differentiation around status quo aggregate emissions, 
whereas we consider the second-best uniform policy, with much higher levels of abatement.  Given the 
convexity of the cost curves, the deadweight losses around these points from imposing uniformity will be 
different.  There are other differences as well.  Our model has a more detailed treatment of plant-specific 
abatement costs, but their model has a more detailed treatment of plant-specific benefits.  That is, "hete-
rogeneity" means something different in the two applications:  necessarily, the gains from considering 
inter-plant heterogeneity will be larger than considering inter-jurisdictional heterogeneity.  
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To understand these results, Table 2 provides the estimated optimal marginal abatement 
costs of each policy for each state as well as the associated level of abatement for that marginal 
abatement cost.  We will refer to this table in the following three sub-sections, which consider 
the results from each of the three policies in more detail. 
4.1.  Reference Policy 
Column A of Table 2 shows the marginal national benefits of abatement in each state, 
which corresponds to the Pigouvian tax on SO2 emissions in the reference policy (or price for a 
pollution permit in that state).  For comparison, prices for SO2 permits have ranged from $100 to 
$1600 in recent years.  From these data alone, we can see that there is substantial inter-state 
heterogeneity in the marginal benefits of abatement, a factor favoring local policies, as described 
in Proposition 2.  Marginal benefits are lowest in Maine, at $1091/ton SO2, but 5.7 times higher 
in California, which has the highest marginal benefits at $6199/ton SO2.  The median is $3181.  
These differences are not due only to outliers.  The average of the marginal benefits among the 
ten highest-benefit states is $4703/ton, whereas the average among the ten lowest-benefit states 
is $1398/ton—still a 3.4-fold difference. 
Naturally, there is substantial heterogeneity in optimal abatement as well, shown in Col-
umn B, ranging from 925 tons in Montana to 2.1 million tons in Illinois.  Not only that, there is 
substantial heterogeneity in relative abatement, ranging from under 10% in North Dakota and 
Montana to 98.5% in Illinois, relative to a simulated baseline of no taxes or caps.  The mean is 
72.1% abatement.
18 
From these data, it would appear that there would be substantial welfare gains from ac-
counting for such heterogeneity in pollution policies.  As we shall see, however, this is not so 
because of the role of marginal costs. 
4.2.  State Policies 
The next three columns of Table 2 consider the policy of devolving all control of SO2 to 
the states.  In this policy, individual states are free to set their own price of pollution, but in doing 
so we assume they consider only their own benefits and ignore inter-state externalities. 
Column C shows the within-state marginal benefits, which are the Pigouvian taxes (or in-
                                                                 
18 Data on percentage abatement are not shown in the table, but are available upon request.  
22 
 
duced marginal abatement cost) that self-interested states would adopt on their own.  Column D 
shows those benefits relative to total national benefits (i.e., the percentage of marginal benefits 
internalized within-state).  On average, only 16% of marginal benefits are internalized within-
state and prices are on average $2592 too low.  Concordant with Proposition 1, state policies that 
fail to internalize the other 84% of benefits are bound to be sub-optimal.  Figure 4 plots (in solid 
diamonds) the pollution prices that each state would choose for itself against the optimal prices 
(i.e. Column C against Column B).  Each point is below the 45-degree line because states are 
ignoring inter-state spillovers. 
However, there is also substantial geographic heterogeneity.  California is again the state 
with the highest within-state benefits, at $4975/ton SO2, while North Dakota has the lowest at 
only $19/ton, a difference of 257-fold.  Even averaging the top-10 and bottom-10 states, the 
difference is $1569/ton vs. $70/ton, a factor of 22.4.  This heterogeneity in MBii reflects the 
underlying heterogeneity in marginal national benefits (MNBi) that were displayed in Column A.  
The correlation between the two is 0.59, indicating that the pattern of the first-best values are 
reflected in states’ own incentives.  The correlation is not perfect because of variation in the 
extent to which national benefits are internalized within-state (i.e. the ratios MBii/MNBi).  Cali-
fornia again leads the way here, with its within-state benefits capturing 80.3% of the national 
benefits (Column D).  In the case of California, the size of the state suggests that much of the 
exposure from emissions will be within the state, while downwind states like Nevada are sparse-
ly populated.  The other top-10 states in terms of internalizing most of their damages are all 
Atlantic seaboard states (or, in the case of Pennsylvania, close to the coast), because much of 
their downwind spillovers falls relatively harmlessly over the ocean.  On average, these ten states 
have within-state marginal benefits that are 38.4% of the national benefits.  At the opposite 
extreme, the ten states least likely to internalize their national damages are all sparsely populated 
states, mostly in the West and Midwest—states like Wyoming and the Dakotas.  On average, 
these ten states have within-state marginal benefits that are only 3.3% of national benefits.  
These patterns can go a long way toward explaining which states we observe to be adopting 
policies beyond federal requirements, states like California, Texas, North Carolina, and northeas-
tern states (Chupp 2009). 
Finally, Column E shows the abatement under the simulated state policies and Column F 
shows this abatement relative to the reference policy level.  Figure 5 plots each state's self- 
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chosen abatement against their abatement in the reference policy (again in solid diamonds).  
Whereas the average state chooses a price that is only 16.3% of total benefits, it does achieve 
36.5% of optimal abatement.  Moreover, total abatement is 57.8% of the optimal amount (be-
cause on average the large polluters internalize more than the small polluters).  This indicates 
that the marginal abatement cost elasticities are generally low over the relevant range.  Indeed, 
some states come quite close to the optimum:  California for example achieves 99.9% of the 
omtimal abatement just by behaving in its own interest, and New Jersey, North Carolina, Mary-
land and Virginia all achieve over 80%.  On the other hand, Kansas, North and South Dakota, 
and Wyoming all abate less than 2% of the optimal quantity of abatement. 
4.3.  Uniform Policy 
Last, we consider the second-best federal policy, which restricts marginal abatement costs to be 
equal in all states.  Figure 6 shows the solution for SO2, in which we calculate the optimal 
uniform pollution price to be $3912.  Again, this compares to an average SO2 price in the US of 
$100 to $1600 prevailing in recent years.  This type of policy is the one studied by Banzhaf et al. 
(2004), and our results are close to theirs.
19  However, they did not consider the relative efficien-
cy of this policy to first-best or the issue of inter-state heterogeneity in damages, which is the 
focus of this paper. 
The model in Section 2 suggests that if all marginal abatement cost curves have the form 
MCi(Ai)=MC(αiA), then the uniform price would be a weighted average of the states' damages, 
with the α's as weights.  Further, we argued that if all marginal abatement cost curves had the 
same shape over the domain [0,    ], where     is 100% abatement in state i, then the     could 
serve as weights.  Using simulated baseline emissions as weights in this way, we compute a 
weighted average pollution price of $3953—quite close to our estimated optimal tu of $3912.  
Thus, as discussed in Section 2, supply elasticities play a crucial role in determining the uniform 
price. 
                                                                 
19 Our second-best uniform SO2 price of $3912 compares to their estimate of $3500.  The difference is 
due to an inconsistency embedded in their results that we have eliminated.  In particular, in their model 
ancillary benefits of NOx reductions from SO2 "taxes" (or vice versa) were included in the net benefit 
function, but general equilibrium shifts in abatement cost curves were ignored.  We use a partial equili-
brium approach that looks only at one pollutant at a time.  This approach is more straight-forward and 
more consistent.  Sensitivity analyses using their estimates suggest this would not qualitatively affect the 
results found here.  
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Column G of Table 2 shows how this price compares to national benefits from abatement 
in each state.  These data are also plotted in Figure 4 (open squares).  Obviously, by definition, 
this policy ignores all heterogeneity in marginal benefits.  Accordingly, it systematically pro-
vides too little incentive for abatement in high-benefit states and too much incentive in low-
benefit states.  In California, for example, this value of $3912/ton SO2 is only 63.1% of the first-
best value.  The average across the ten state with the highest abatement benefits is 84.2% of the 
first-best value.  At the same time, the uniform policy induces substantial over-control in low-
benefit states.  The uniform SO2 price is 358.5% higher than the abatement benefits in Maine, the 
lowest-benefit state.  The average across the ten lowest benefit states is 287.5% of the first-best 
values.  Because of this over-control, eight Western states plus West Virginia and Alabama 
actually experience greater welfare gains under the policy in which all states internalize only 
within-state benefits than under the uniform policy.  However, because they enjoy the control of 
upwind polluters, the other 35 states in our analysis do better under the uniform policy.
20 
It is informative to compare the uniform price with the states' policies.  As noted above, 
on average states' self-chosen prices are $2592 too low; the average of percentages is 84% too 
low.  By comparison, the average of the absolute value of the error in the uniform price is $1092; 
the average of absolute percentage differences is 40%.  These errors are about half that made 
under the state policies.  Consequently, for the case of SO2 pollution in the US, we can conclude 
that on balance the problem of ignoring inter-jurisdictional spillovers outweighs the problem of 
ignoring heterogeneity in marginal benefits.  Based on the factors described in Propositions 1 
and 2, we would conclude that the national policy is better than the state policies. 
However, the errors made by the uniform policy are still significant, so it is surprising 
that the net benefits of this policy are as much as 99.8 percent of the benefits under the reference 
policy.  The explanation lies in our Proposition 3, which relates the quantity responses to the 
policy to the convexity of the marginal cost curves.  Column H of Table 2 displays the abatement 
in each state induced by the uniform price, and Column I displays this amount relative to the 
reference policy.  Figure 5 graphs the relationship (Column H versus Column B).  As seen in the 
figure, most states are on or very close to the 45-degree line under the uniform policy, indicating 
                                                                 
20 In computing these distributional welfare effects, we assume any revenues from taxes or permit 
auctions are returned to the states lump-sum.  
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abatement near first-best levels. 
Thus, the reason for the near-perfect performance of the uniform policy is not just that the 
errors in the price signals are smaller.  It is also that they occur at higher prices on average, 
where the marginal abatement cost curves are more inelastic.  As shown in Figure 3, our esti-
mated marginal cost curves exhibit a good deal of convexity, and the uniform policy tends to 
occur in a region where they are quite inelastic.  Accordingly, errors in price signals correspond 
to small errors in abatement, and hence small deadweight losses.  This is the new relationship 
identified in Proposition 3.  Figure 7 confirms this intuition.  It plots the arc elasticity over the 
relevant range of the marginal cost curve for the uniform policy against the respective elasticity 
for the state policy.
21  The figure shows that the elasticities are lower than one for all but three of 
the states under the uniform policy and under 0.75 for half; many are near zero.  The elasticities 
are still lower than one for about three-quarters of the states under the states' policies, but the 
elasticities there are higher than under the uniform policy for all but two states.  To the best of 
our knowledge, the important role of marginal cost elasticities and the way they interact with 
heterogeneity in benefits has been missed in the environmental federalism literature. 
4.4.  Sensitivity Analysis 
In the TAF model, heterogeneity in marginal benefits arises from differences in air dispersal and 
differences in downwind population densities and age distributions.  These result in heterogenei-
ty in the injuries resulting from emissions at different locations.  However, the model imposes 
homogeneity in the willingness to pay for a specific effect.  In particular the value of a statistical 
life (VSL) is assumed to be the same in all states.  In fact, the VSL literature finds a clear rela-
tionship between income and willingness-to-pay (WTP) for health risk reduction.  This relation-
ship can be used to adjust the benefits derived from TAF to take account of inter-state differenc-
es in income.  First, we take the calculated income elasticity from the VSL literature.  Mrozek 
and Taylor (2002) and Viscusi and Aldy (2003) estimate a range of income elasticities varying 
from 0.37 to 0.85.  We use this range of elasticities, together with inter-state differences in mean 
income, to compute state-specific VSLs. 
Surprisingly, larger income elasticities actually cause the net benefits of the state policy 
                                                                 
21 That is, for the two second-best policies, it computes the elasticity as the percentage deviation from the 
first-best level of abatement divided by the percentage deviation from the first-best price.  
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to fall slightly while the uniform policy benefits rise slightly, further exacerbating the difference 
between the two policies.
22  This result is somewhat counterintuitive.  As the income elasticity 
rises, so does state level heterogeneity in damages.
23  Since heterogeneity in damages is the 
rationale for the possible superiority of state-level policies, it would seem that a higher income 
elasticity should improve the position of the state policies relative to the uniform policy.  How-
ever, the result is driven by the fact that lower-income states tend to be upwind of higher income 
states in general, so that spillovers become more important. 
4.5.  Nitrogen Oxides 
In addition to considering the case of SO2 pollution, we also consider nitrogen oxides 
(NOx), the second-most important pre-cursor of urban air pollution in the US.  We find similar 
results, which are if anything more pronounced.  With NOx the state policies result in a loss of 
76.2% of the potential benefits, while the uniform policy results in a loss of 2.32%.  The uniform 
policy again approximates the fully differentiated solution fairly well.  These results are available 
upon request. 
5.  Conclusion. 
Improvements in air pollution have been some of the most important environmental achieve-
ments in many nations over the last 50 years.  Air pollution exhibits the classic tradeoff of 
environmental federalism.  It can travel great distances, making it a transboundary problem.  At 
the same time, its damages are quite heterogeneous, depending on downwind population density. 
In the United States, initial control by the states has been ceded to the federal government 
over time, especially with the passage of the 1970 Clean Air Act.  Our analysis suggests this 
centralization is consistent with welfare optimization, for two reasons.  First, the standard theory 
suggests that centralization is appropriate when inter-jurisdictional spillovers are more important 
that heterogeneity in damages, and we find that this is indeed the case for air pollution in the US.  
Second, our theoretical model shows that in addition, centralization will be more appropriate 
when marginal costs are increasing in abatement, which we also find to be the case for US air 
pollution.  As a consequence of these two factors, the state policies lose 31.5% of potential SO2 
                                                                 
22 Results available upon request. 
23 The standard deviation of state level benefits is 801.44 when η = 0, but rises to 860.43 when η = 0.75.  
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benefits, whereas the central uniform policy loses only 0.2%.  Results are similar for NOx. 
In undertaking this analysis, we might be accused of committing the nirvana fallacy.  It is 
important to acknowledge that while we show that, hypothetically, a uniform policy in the US 
could achieve something close to the second-best, in fact the US federal government has not 
actually adopted anything like this policy, despite having 40 years since the passage of the first 
Clean Air Act to get it right.  This failure opens the door to questions about government failures 
and the political economy of pollution control.  Decentralization may allow better oversight by 
citizens, provide discipline if citizens "vote with their feet," and encourage experiments in the 
laboratories of democracy.  These may be the best reasons to pursue decentralization (Anderson 
and Hill 1997, Oates 2002a). 
But in another sense our results may have broader applicability.  Indeed, they may be 
viewed as one more interpretation of the so-called "Precautionary Principle."  This idea has 
played a leading role in environmental policy since at least 1992, when it served as a guiding 
principle for both the Maastricht Treaty and the Rio Earth Summit.  Heretofore somewhat 
inchoate, the notion of the precautionary principle is roughly that, given uncertainty about 
optimal regulation, over-abatement is to be preferred to under-abatement.  Our results suggest a 
new, rigorous sense in which this may be true.  If marginal abatement costs are increasing at an 
increasing rate in abatement, over-pricing pollution by a given amount will result in a lower 
welfare loss than under-pricing it by the same amount.  If the optimal policy is for some reason 
not available, resolving "ties" in favor of the policy with higher pollution prices will raise 
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Table 1—Net Benefits of SO2 Control 
Contribution from 
Abatement in… 
Net Benefits from 
Reference Policy 
Net Benefits from 
State Policy
 
Net Benefits from 
National Uniform 
Policy 
AL  $661,028,298 $33,016,753  $661,028,298 
AZ  $6,391,725 $1,722,498 $573,964 
AR  $1,305,728,466 $706,103,362 $1,305,634,156 
CA  $34,485,744 $34,483,447  $34,477,369 
CO  $31,005,685 $9,010,639  $21,002,010 
CT  $31,380,594 $24,492,181  $31,375,460 
DE  $303,794,021 $48,338,057  $303,106,444 
FL  $996,720,290 $803,722,133  $996,701,970 
GA  $2,602,325,127 $1,597,896,943 $2,602,331,630 
IL  $8,073,744,024 $6,921,572,918 $8,073,744,024 
IN  $5,374,877,882 $3,966,470,718 $5,374,810,768 
IA  $60,972,390 $5,604,278  $58,279,284 
KS  $88,499,986 $1,779,092  $87,853,729 
KY  $1,308,859,577 $312,105,142 $1,308,855,956 
LA  $713,810,411 $541,137,044  $713,789,372 
ME  $1,909,834 $1,187,025 $381,291 
MD  $2,497,197,282 $2,191,571,450 $2,497,213,514 
MA  $15,238,952 $12,215,991  $14,500,879 
MI  $4,011,629,201 $3,496,625,444 $4,011,731,564 
MN  $16,127,884 $2,017,672  $14,128,508 
MS  $96,555,836 $4,083,957  $96,555,836 
MO  $918,321,033 $94,300,466  $918,312,248 
MT  $375,060 $33,443  -$4,057,525 
NE  $8,876,294 $595,494  -$4,260,891 
NV  $118,046,805 $9,431,228  $115,377,440 
NH  $4,387,117 $317,921  $1,678,970 
NJ  $365,267,429 $341,020,573  $364,535,077 
NM  $877,975 $133,396  $547,414 
NY  $628,597,109 $519,436,239  $628,568,301 
NC  $7,545,447,495 $6,896,616,405 $7,532,570,699 
ND  $531,592 $18,371  -$9,102,678 
OH  $2,923,193,583 $1,780,222,678 $2,922,867,427 
OK  $1,093,557,983 $434,499,547 $1,093,469,228 
OR  $17,618,432 $2,314,769  $17,177,875 
PA  $1,979,018,950 $1,370,518,302 $1,978,933,386 
SC  $1,706,878,513 $1,432,739,626 $1,705,129,316 
SD  $1,334,581 $53,668  -$1,264,515 
TN  $947,151,775 $242,834,499  $947,139,955 
TX  $2,293,320,237 $1,777,032,495 $2,292,121,469 
UT  $4,648,263 $736,544  -$2,774,690 
VA  $2,774,857,978 $2,508,986,398 $2,770,717,810 
WA  $9,202,889 $3,471,904  -$4,757,596 
WV  $5,462,105,096 $1,033,766,266 $5,462,272,608 
WI  $2,695,094,557 $1,748,745,698 $2,694,695,095 
WY  $4,894,636 $183,164  -$6,031,187 
Totals  $59,735,888,591 $40,913,165,839 $59,621,941,265 
Difference from 
Optimal NB     $18,822,722,751 
(31.5%) 
$113,947,326 
      (0.2%) 
*Net benefits presented here are the nation-wide benefits of reduced emissions in the given state minus the state’s costs of 
attaining that level of abatement. 
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Table 2—Marginal SO2 Abatement Costs (or Pollution Price) and Associated Abatement Levels 











State Price as 

















% of  
Pigouvian 
AL $4,133.10  283,160 $343.58 8.3% 8,335  2.9%  94.7%            283,160  100.0% 
AZ  $1,707.51  7,466  $247.80  14.5%  1,088  14.6%  229.1%          14,004  187.6% 
AR $4,637.93  334,470 $375.59 8.1%  158,670  47.4%  84.3%            334,040  99.9% 
CA  $6,199.27  7,156  $4,975.46  80.3%  7,127  99.7%  63.1%            7,149  99.9% 
CO $1,632.33  44,902  $291.53 17.9%  6,061  13.5%  239.7%          69,091  153.9% 
CT  $3,739.77  11,353  $1,060.46  28.4%  7,225  63.6%  104.6%          11,415  100.5% 
DE $2,526.79  146,720  $81.56  3.2% 19,444  13.3%  154.8%            148,490  101.2% 
FL  $3,528.00  389,960  $1,240.30  35.2%  257,900  66.1%  110.9%            390,020  100.0% 
GA $3,825.17  902,190 $482.79 12.6%  445,870  49.4%  102.3%            902,220  100.0% 
IL  $4,428.95  2,107,100  $837.04  18.9%  1,664,600  79.0%  88.3%          41,494  119.6% 
IN $4,271.14  1,478,700  $435.29 10.2%  978,530  66.2% 91.6%         2,107,100  100.0% 
IA  $3,184.11  34,705  $139.51  4.4%  1,800  5.2%  122.9%         1,478,600  100.0% 
KS $2,943.90  54,528 $113.87 3.9%  616  1.1%  132.9%          56,226  103.1% 
KY  $4,362.10  403,580  $307.69  7.1%  74,165  18.4%  89.7%            403,800  100.0% 
LA $4,122.66  208,060 $657.81 16.0%  140,300  67.4% 94.9%            207,970  100.0% 
ME  $1,091.30  2,605  $302.32  27.7%  1,263  48.5%  358.5%            4,094  157.1% 
MD $3,874.41  736,320  $654.99 16.9%  605,860  82.3%  101.0%            736,350  100.0% 
MA  $2,304.91  10,954  $1,063.06  46.1%  6,568  60.0%  169.7%          12,223  111.6% 
MI $3,580.13  1,352,700 $534.50  14.9%  1,050,300 77.6%  109.3%         1,354,900  100.2% 
MN  $2,973.92  12,275  $399.84  13.4%  727  5.9%  131.5%           16,239  132.3% 
MS $3,893.92  46,223  $293.67 7.5% 1,090  2.4%  100.5%            46,223  100.0% 
MO  $3,682.91  376,200  $260.87  7.1%  26,545  7.1%  106.2%            376,480  100.1% 
MT $1,104.10  925  $52.39  4.7% 31  3.4%  354.3%           5,967  645.4% 
NE  $1,584.08  10,996  $52.60  3.3%  382  3.5%  247.0%          22,663  206.1% 
NV $2,389.29  104,360 $126.13 5.3% 4,054  3.9%  163.7%            111,400  106.7% 
NH  $1,474.36  7,488  $134.77  9.1%  226  3.0%  265.3%          12,872  171.9% 
NJ $4,922.04  94,464 $2,297.02  46.7%  81,956 86.8%  79.5%          93,173  98.6%  
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NM  $1,633.95  934  $99.16  6.1%  84  9.0%  239.4%            1,441  154.3% 
NY $3,889.20  205,350 $1,249.50  32.1%  149,600 72.9%  100.6%            205,610  100.1% 
NC  $4,753.78  1,842,500  $1,071.42  22.5%  1,537,000  83.4%  82.3%         1,815,600  98.5% 
ND $1,109.55  958  $19.34  1.7% 17  1.7%  352.6%           7,767  810.5% 
OH  $3,874.56  1,055,500  $549.61  14.2%  491,990  46.6%  101.0%         1,058,100  100.2% 
OK $3,455.63  412,000 $261.44 7.6%  130,680  31.7%  113.2%            412,220  100.1% 
OR  $3,196.00  11,456  $621.09  19.4%  802  7.0%  122.4%             12,897  112.6% 
PA $3,843.79  703,080 $859.59  22.4% 388,580  55.3% 101.8%            704,780  100.2% 
SC  $3,529.74  582,110  $462.80  13.1%  434,380  74.6%  110.8%            589,870  101.3% 
SD $1,414.55  1,885  $28.87  2.0% 38  2.0%  276.6%    4,215  223.6% 
TN  $4,393.99  306,270  $383.81  8.7%  57,789  18.9%  89.0%            306,350  100.0% 
TX $3,194.46  921,870 $628.08 19.7%  606,090  65.8%  122.5%  928,150  100.7% 
UT  $1,648.95  9,093  $236.24  14.3%  481  5.3%  237.2%         20,532  225.8% 
VA $4,929.50  642,740  $1,040.73 21.1%  538,930  83.9% 79.4%            635,650  98.9% 
WA  $1,726.98  16,900  $731.53  42.4%  2,551  15.1%  226.5%         34,750  205.6% 
WV $3,691.71 1,691,100  $101.57 2.8%  283,930  16.8%  106.0%            944,670  100.2% 
WI  $3,436.60  943,180  $373.50  10.9%  538,100  57.1%  113.8%         1,691,400  100.0% 
WY $1,286.52  9,406  $26.08  2.0% 144  1.5%  304.1%       25,443  270.5% 
Total   18,525,885      10,711,919 57.8%    18,560,303  100.19% 
The first column shows the Pigouvian price of pollution for each state, accounting for spillovers.  This is the reference policy.  The second column shows the resulting abatement in 
each state.  The third column shows the price each state would choose, and the fourth the resulting abatement.  The fifth and sixth columns show these prices and abatements 
relative to the Pigouvian.  The seventh column shows the abatement occurring in each state under a federally imposed price of $3,912 per ton SO2.  The eighth and ninth show this 
price and induced abatement as respective shares of the reference policy. 
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Figure 1A.  Efficiency loss with uniform pollution price:  Heterogeneity in abatement 
benefits but not abatement costs. 
 
Figure 1B.  Efficiency loss with uniform pollution price: Heterogeneity in abatement 
benefits and abatement costs. 
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Figure 2. Marginal Abatement Cost Curves for SO2 
 
The dashed line represents the raw data from the electricity model, while the solid line reflects application of the 
Lowess smoother. 
 
Figure 2a.  Colorado. 
 
 

















Figure 2c.  Texas. 
 
 






Figure 3—Marginal Cost and Marginal Benefit Curves for SO2 Abatement 
 
The solid line represents the marginal cost of abatement curve.  The dashed line at $3912 represents the 
second-best uniform price.  The upper of the other two dashed lines represents marginal damages from 
the state, and thus the Pigouvian price.  The lower dashed-line represents marginal damages that fall 
within the respective state, and thus the price the state would select when ignoring spillovers.
 
Fig. 3a.  Louisiana 
 
 



















Fig. 3c.  California. 
 
 
Fig. 3d.  Illinois  
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Figure 4.  Pollution Prices under State and Uniform Policies vs. Reference Policy 
 
 
This figure shows the pollution prices chosen by states under a devolved policy (solid diamonds) as well 
as the uniform price of $3912 (open squares) plotted against each states' respective optimal price.  



















































































Figure 5.  Abatement under State and Uniform Policies vs. Reference Policy 
 
 
This figure shows the abatement chosen by states under a devolved policy (solid diamonds) as well as 
each state's abatement under the uniform pollution price of $3912 (open squares) plotted against each 
states' respective optimal abatement.  Departures from the 45-degree line reflect departures from optimal 
abatement. 



























































































Figure 6—National Uniform SO2 Policy 
 
The dashed line represents the national marginal benefit (MB) curve for sulfur dioxide 
abatement.  Notice that, unlike the state MB curves, this curve is not necessarily horizontal.  
State-specific marginal damages are constant, but since different states abate at different 
points in the range of abatement, the national MB curve is not constant.  This line has been 
smoothed with the Lowess smoother.  The solid line represents the national MCA curve.  The 
point of intersection determines the efficient national uniform price, which is $3,912 per ton 
of sulfur dioxide. 
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Figure 7.  Elasticities of Marginal Abatement Costs around Equilibria for State and Uni-
form Policies  
 
The figure plots the elasticities in the marginal abatement cost curve near the uniform policy against the 
state policies.  For each second-best policy, arc elasticities are computed as the percentage deviation in 



























































Abatement Cost Elasticities around State Policies 
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Appendix:  Proof of the Propositions 1-3 and Corollary 
We begin again with an indicator of total welfare: 
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and take a third-order Taylor approximation for changes in ti. Using MC=t and 
    
    ≈0, this gives: 
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(A2)
It will be convenient to use the following additional notation using iid random variables e and u.  
ei is a state's deviation from average national benefits and ui is its spillovers (ui = ∑          .)  
Let MNBi=μ+ei, with E[ei]=0, E[ei
2]=  
 , E[ei
3]=0, and αi  ei.  Let MBii=MNBi - ui, with ui>0, 
E[ui]=υ, E[ui
2]=   
  and αi  ui and ei  ui.  These assumptions reflect the assumptions in the text: 
namely, that the distribution of social benefits is symmetric, and that heterogeneity in costs and 
benefits are orthogonal to each other and to the cost scalings (or baseline emissions) αi.  We 
consider a particular draw k from the state of nature for a vector of N local jurisdictions. 
We will evaluate (A2) at the uniform policy t = μk (and MNBi-t =ei) and consider the 
third-order approximation to the change in welfare from switching to the state policy, so dti= 
(μk+ei-ui)- μk =ei-ui.  Substituting these expressions into (A2) and using 
   
    = 
  
      gives: 
dWsk  ≈ 
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We can take ∂A/∂t out of the summation because it is a constant when evaluated at μk.  First 
summing over i and then taking expectations over k, using the premises that αi  ei, αi  ui, ei  ui, 
E[ei
3]=0 and ∑  =1, and using the fact that E[u2 =   
   υ 2, this expression reduces to: 
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   .  (A4)
To evaluate Proposition 1, consider "scaling up" each inter-state spillover ui by a factor 
θ>0.  Then expression (A4) becomes 
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   . 
Since ∂A/∂t>0 and, by the concavity of A(t) (i.e. convexity of MC(A)), 
   
    | <0, this expression 
is decreasing in θ.  That is, the effect on welfare of switching from the centralized policy to the 
devolved policies is decreasing in inter-state spillovers. 
Similarly, to evaluate Proposition 2, consider instead "scaling up" each error imposed by 
ignoring heterogeneity ei by a factor θ >0.  Then expression (A4) becomes 
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   . 
Again, since ∂A/∂t>0, this expression is increasing in θ.  That is, the effect on welfare of switch-
ing from the centralized policy to the devolved policies is increasing in inter-jurisdictional 
heterogeneity. 
Finally, to evaluate Proposition 3, note that since      
     0 , expression (A4) is increas-
ing in 
   
   .  Increasing (resp. decreasing) this term is equivalent to making A(t) more convex 
(resp. concave), which is equivalent to making MC(A) more concave (resp. convex).  That is, as 
MC(A) becomes more convex, 
   
    must decrease, and welfare from switching to the state 
policies falls.  This completes the proof of the propositions. 
The corollary follows from setting the mean squared errors from the two policies equal:  
  
        
   υ 2.  In this case, expression (A4) collapses to:  
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   . 
When the marginal cost curves are linear, 
   
   =0, and welfare under the two policies is identical.  
When they are convex, 
   
    is negative, and so, since      
    0 ,  switching from the centralized 
policy to the devolved policies decreases welfare.  When they are concave, 
   
    is positive, and 
switching from the centralized policy to the devolved policies increases welfare.  This completes 
the proof of the corollary. 